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 The year 2019 marks the 15th anniversary of the Eastern EU 
enlargement that incorporated the Visegrád Four, the Baltic 
Three and Slovenia into the EU. But it also marks the 30th 
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the great po-
litical transformation that paved the way for the German as 
well as the pan-European reunifi cation.
After the transformational recession of the early 1990s, the 
region demonstrated strong growth potential that has been 
consolidated by EU membership. However, the EU acces-
sion of East-Central European countries resulted in an im-
balanced Single Market in which the positions and strate-
gies of Eastern members have to be scrutinised from the 
perspective of economic as well as social sustainability.
In this article, I explore some key trends and point to some 
controversies. I argue that social convergence requires par-
ticular attention alongside economic convergence, and the 
decoupling of the two is a trend that should be a matter of 
concern. At the end, I highlight some ideas and initiatives in 
the context of East-West convergence policies.
End of boom and bust – almost
The ‘Eastern enlargement’ in May 2004 opened the EU’s 
doors to ten countries. Eight of these (the four Visegrád 
states, the three Baltic countries and a former Yugoslav 
state) had at that time completed their 15-year transition to-
wards a market economy. In the fi rst half of the 1990s these 
countries’ income, measured in terms of GDP, had fallen by 
20 to 30 percent. Poland was the fi rst country to return to 
the same income levels as before the transition, followed by 
Hungary in 2000, and the other countries followed later on.
Even if East-Central Europe did not experience the same 
type of disintegration as the Soviet Union, the global eco-
nomic signifi cance of this region diminished in the 1990s, 
while emerging economies, especially in Asia, were catch-
ing up fast. The transformational recession in the early 
1990s was unexpected but also unprecedented due to 
simultaneous challenges in micro- and macroeconomics 
as well as international economic relations.1 New markets 
had to be found to replace the collapsing Comecon system, 
while privatisation and repeated cycles of fi scal and mon-
etary stabilisation dominated the domestic agenda.
The experience of the ‘great transformation’ which began 
in East-Central Europe 30 years ago played a key role in 
determining what citizens of the new Member States ex-
pected from their accession to the EU: stable and sustain-
able growth. If we look at the period since 2004, the region 
seems to have been catching up with Western Europe in 
terms of employment and economic performance.2
However, the fi nancial and economic crisis, which started in 
2008, disrupted the previous trend of convergence to some 
extent. Greater differences between individual countries’ 
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performances also emerged. Poland managed to escape 
the recession in 2009 while the Baltic Three experienced 
double digit contraction. Among the Visegrád Four, Slova-
kia, for example, continued to catch up, while Hungary fell 
behind on growth, employment and social indicators. More 
recently, Romania joined the club of fast-growing econo-
mies. EU membership has played a major part in consoli-
dating strong economic performance in East-Central Eu-
rope, despite the fact that post-crisis growth rates were 
modest compared to the 2002-2008 period.3
The European Community (which in 1957 originally com-
prised six Member States) had already taken in nine ad-
ditional countries prior to this enlargement. But the 2004 
enlargement was different because the income disparity 
between new and old Member States was much more sig-
nifi cant than in any previous round. As a result, great imbal-
ances have developed: capital fl owed largely from West to 
East, while workers went mainly from East to West.
Imbalanced Single Market: large labour outfl ows
Eastern enlargements doubled the volumes of intra-EU la-
bour mobility. According to estimates, around fi ve percent 
of the Polish labour force now resides in other EU Member 
States, while this number has exceeded 10% for Romania 
and Lithuania. Given the fact that young people are over-
represented among Eastern EU-migrants, these labour 
outfl ows tend to generate and sustain population decline, 
especially in regions with lower than average fertility and 
higher than average mortality.
At the same time, personal remittances paid by expatriates 
to their home countries have reached signifi cant magnitudes 
– over three percent of GDP in Romania, Bulgaria and Lithu-
ania. In the short term, these infl ows are important for the 
prosperity and the balance of payments of the home coun-
tries. However, in the long-run, it is questionable whether re-
mittances can be sustained at suffi ciently high levels to ac-
tually offset the negative consequences of workers’ outfl ow 
from East-Central Europe and the increasing dependency 
ratio between the employed and non-employed population 
in these countries. If labour mobility is a threat to social se-
curity systems, it is mainly in the sending countries.
Fortunately, mobile workers also occasionally return. They 
bring valuable new skills and experience that benefi t the 
3 Strong and convergent income growth in the East has been particu-
larly striking in comparison with divergent growth and unemployment 
trends between North and South (or Eurozone core and periphery), 
which is not subject of this study. For more on income growth in the 
East see C. A l c i d i  et al.: Income Convergence in the EU: A tale of 
two speeds, CEPS Commentary, 9 January 2018, available at https://
www.ceps.eu/system/fi les/ConvergencePDF.pdf.
economies of their countries. The example of Poland in 
2011-2012 shows that returning workers can contribute to 
a country’s above-average growth performance. Gener-
ally, most people entering East-Central European Member 
States are actually returning nationals.
Although the destination countries in Western Europe bene-
fi t a great deal from mobile East-Central European workers 
in economic terms, these countries are also witnessing a 
kind of ‘welfare chauvinism’, turning public opinion against 
EU migrants. Some people fi nd it hard to accept that the 
EU’s enlargement to the East has brought with it not only 
countries and markets but also people and these people 
have the same rights. In fact, the 2004 and 2007 enlarge-
ments brought more instead of less welfare to the receiving 
countries: a higher proportion of mobile citizens from East-
Central Europe are of working age, in good health and more 
often employed, compared with nationals of the destination 
countries; therefore, they are actually net contributors to 
their social security systems.
The real risks of labour mobility from East to West are not in 
the recipient countries but in the sending countries. A large 
percentage of workers who migrate from East-Central Eu-
rope to the West are overqualifi ed for the jobs in which they 
fi nd themselves. In 2012 this was the case for about half of 
East-Central European migrants who had completed higher 
education. This rate of over-qualifi cation is more than twice 
as high as for the nationals of the receiving countries. In 
certain sectors of employment, particularly health care, we 
can speak of a ‘brain drain’ which leads to serious problems 
in the sending countries.
Behind mobility: an inner periphery
The eastward enlargements, which took place in 2004 and 
2007, doubled the mobility of labour within the EU. This mo-
bility is likely to be sustained as long as income disparities 
between Member States persist. However, this should not 
be seen as an automatic link that is independent of all other 
factors. For example, there is a large income disparity be-
tween the Czech Republic and its neighbour Germany, and 
yet relatively few Czechs migrate. This is obviously partly 
due to the fact that in the Czech Republic, the at-risk-of-
poverty rate (10%) is even below that of Germany (16%), de-
spite a much lower per capita GDP.
In several new Member States the issue of fi nding a way 
out of poverty is linked to the situation of the Roma popula-
tion. While there is a sizeable Roma minority in some of the 
older Member States, for example Spain, Roma integration 
has really become an issue in the EU only since the 2004 
enlargement. Not all Roma are poor, but in Romania, Bul-
garia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Roma 
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minority and the rest of the population are worlds apart in 
terms of education, employment, health and housing. As 
a result of constant prejudice and open racism (in many 
cases with political support), it is diffi cult to overcome this 
disparity and often even to determine its extent.
Other features also distinguish East-Central Europe from 
older EU Member States, for example, working conditions. 
There are major differences between East and West with 
regard to the degree of organisation of employers and em-
ployees. According to the OECD, less than one-fi fth of wage 
and salary earners in Poland or the Czech Republic are ac-
tually members of trade unions – compared with a share of 
almost 70% in the Scandinavian Member States. This means 
that in terms of economic policy there is a constant temp-
tation to improve competitiveness at the workers’ expense. 
Recent changes in Hungarian labour law provide examples 
that would not be acceptable in Western or especially Nordic 
countries. In the area of vocational education and innovation 
capacity, substantial progress has only been made in East-
Central Europe in relation to individual foreign investments.
It can therefore be said that most of the newer Member 
States, irrespective of the varying speeds of convergence 
(in terms of GDP), have developed as an ‘inner periphery’ 
within the EU. The region’s booming capital cities are an ex-
ception, which only reinforce the challenge in terms of eco-
nomic, social and territorial cohesion.
Wage dynamics and competitiveness
East-Central European wage dynamics deserve attention for 
economic and social reasons. Wages are not only low com-
pared to Western Europe but, as demonstrated by a number 
of variables, also tend to be lower than what the economic 
potential of these countries would allow.4 After the initial and 
turbulent phase of the transformation process, wages in all 
East-Central European economies started to grow dynami-
cally from the mid-1990s up until the 2009 recession.5 In the 
wake of the crisis, however, wage convergence either expe-
rienced a sudden halt or slowed down substantially.
Wage trends are not simply by-products of the macroeco-
nomic processes. Maintaining wage cost competitiveness 
has been part of a reindustrialisation and broader economic 
development strategy in many cases. In Poland, for exam-
4 B. G a l g ó c z i : Why central and eastern Europe needs a pay rise, ETUI 
Working Paper No. 2017.01, european trade union institute, 2017, 
available at http://www.fesbp.hu/common/pdf/2017_Galgoczi_Why_
central_and_eastern_Europe_needs_a_pay_rise_EN.pdf.
5 Wage convergence in the pre-crisis period was spectacular, particu-
larly when expressed in euro terms. Czech wages, for example, more 
than quadrupled between 1993 and 2010 in comparison to Germany, 
and most CEE countries showed a similar pattern. See B. G a l g ó c z i , 
op. cit.
ple, the early 2000s saw an aggressive reduction of wage 
share in the manufacturing industry. And even in the past 
fi ve years of strong GDP growth, wage convergence has 
been sluggish, which is a trend increasingly frustrated by 
sectoral or more general labour shortages.
Can the EU do anything about East-Central European 
wages, and should we think about this at all? Wages and 
wage setting represent an area where the EU has no direct 
competences but in various ways the issue has gradually 
come under EU infl uence. Most importantly, the EU crisis 
response brought pressure towards a decentralisation of 
wage-setting mechanisms, a disruption of pre-crisis collec-
tive agreements, and a downward adjustment of the mini-
mum wage in programme countries in particular. This came 
in addition to a longer-term trend of a declining wage share 
in a number of countries. In order to counter such nega-
tive trends, a campaign for a European Wage Alliance was 
launched to focus on the central question of East-West up-
ward wage convergence.
Some concrete proposals have already been outlined for a 
prospective wage coordination policy. For example, agree-
ment could be sought on a guaranteed wage fl oor in each 
country, based upon a coordinated approach towards mini-
mum wages at the EU level that ensure that the levels are 
set above the poverty threshold and represent decent pay 
for the work undertaken. Guaranteed national minimum 
wages would help sustain internal demand while also im-
proving the situation of posted workers and helping to fi ght 
social dumping.
Further, a guaranteed minimum income (at different levels 
per country) could be an effective way of ensuring adequate 
income support and fi ghting poverty while providing for 
activation incentives where relevant. Such a ‘national so-
cial fl oor’ would also indirectly defi ne the minimum perfor-
mance expected from national automatic fi scal stabilisers 
in times of economic crisis.
East-West imbalance and the social question
Beyond wages, the more general state of social security and 
social protection had an infl uence on East-West relations in 
the EU. In certain periods (e.g. 2011-2013) certain segments 
of Western media and politics were obsessed with poor mi-
grants from the East and their access to social benefi ts in 
receiving countries. The purpose of that discourse was not 
so much to develop a common strategy to improve the well-
being of those citizens, but to exclude them somehow from 
the richer countries and their welfare systems.
The never ending debate on social dumping supports the 
feeling in the East, and especially in the Visegrád countries 
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that the West does not want to see economic competi-
tion from the East and that arbitrary rules in the area of the 
mobility of services were introduced to push back Eastern 
companies in the very few sectors where they might be 
competitive: namely construction and road transport.6
Such controversies refl ect the general fear that the enlarge-
ment of the EU to the East puts the feasibility of a ‘Social 
Europe’ into question. Rounds of enlargements created a 
geographical divide in Europe in terms of productivity and 
wage levels and made the EU much more imbalanced and 
heterogeneous as compared to its predecessor, the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which in itself can be seen as 
an obstacle to a deep social dimension whether it requires 
more common legislation or common funds.7
It is of course good news that there is economic conver-
gence between East and West. However, those who believe 
that all problems in the East will be slowly resolved by ex-
periencing higher than average GDP growth need to look 
beyond the GDP growth fi gures and see the gaps in health 
conditions, life expectancy and, in particular, the extraordi-
nary population decline in Eastern Member States.
Economic convergence seems to be happening simulta-
neously with divergence regarding political values and so-
cial models. Therefore, the EU has to make efforts to en-
sure that economic growth in the East is sustained and is 
coupled with convergence in terms of political and social 
policy standards. In the long run, this is the real solution to 
the problem of social dumping, which has been the focus of 
legislative activity in the past decade. This is the reason for 
the signifi cance of the 2017 European Pillar of Social Rights 
and the insistence of the Commission on the participation 
of non-Eurozone countries.
The East-West divide is often observed through the lens of 
controversies around labour mobility. Upholding the right 
to free movement and to ensure equal treatment for mobile 
workers remains a pivotal issue. But today a key question 
is how the peripheral regions (mainly the Eastern ones) can 
rebuild human capital, which is being lost through constant 
migration towards the West and disinvestment in health and 
education sectors. Besides, the EU must remain active in 
addressing the situation of Roma and promote integration, 
which is arguably Europe’s biggest social challenge today.
6 Concerns about social dumping generated legal and political debates 
in the context of posting workers from one country to another by us-
ing the free movement of services. The legislative outcomes were the 
2014 Enforcement Directive and the 2018 revised Posted Workers Di-
rective.
7 M. M a t z a g a n i s : Snakes and ladders on the road to ESU, EUVisions, 
3 December 2018, available at http://www.euvisions.eu/snakes-and-
ladders-on-the-road-to-esu-matsaganis/.
Social investment imperative
To sustain economic growth in East-Central Europe, but 
also to reproduce the growth potential in the region for the 
long term, a fi rst necessary step for the governments would 
be to rethink their role in the development of human capital 
and invest in it. As the coming decades must combine bet-
ter living conditions for all with higher productivity growth, 
new investments are necessary in education, health and 
social inclusion, where the emphasis – until now – has tend-
ed to be on cutbacks.
Greater social investment is not only a responsibility of the 
public sector but is also in the best interest of companies. 
However, survey data confi rm that businesses in East-Central 
Europe tend to attribute lower priority to human capital issues 
than their Western European peers. This is especially true for 
businesses in Romania and Bulgaria. Poland also stands out: 
on the one hand, Polish business seems to be more optimis-
tic than in Western countries when it comes to the availability 
of skilled, educated, competent and experienced human re-
sources. On the other hand, investments in human capital for-
mation (apprenticeships, attracting talents, training, workers’ 
motivation) tend to be seen as a lower priority in Poland com-
pared to the EU average. Such an attitude may be explained 
by the strength of the cohorts entering the Polish labour mar-
ket in recent years, but cannot be sustained when the work-
force begins to age and shrink as in the rest of Europe.
The great human capital challenge in East-Central Europe 
is well illustrated by data on workers’ participation in lifelong 
learning. With the exceptions of Slovenia and Estonia, East-
Central Member States tend to have a far lower percentage 
of workers or unemployed people who participate in train-
ing and education compared to ‘older’ Member States. Ac-
cording to the Labour Force Survey, in Romania, Slovakia 
and Bulgaria the share is only around fi ve percent.
The necessity to step up investment in human capital should 
be refl ected by the way East-Central European countries 
make use of resources available from EU Structural and In-
vestment Funds (ESIF). The European Social Fund, for ex-
ample, could play a much greater role than before in helping 
to promote the employment of women, young professionals 
starting their career (by introducing the Youth Guarantee), 
Roma integration, labour market integration for people with 
disabilities and active ageing. It can also make a major con-
tribution to improving the quality of education systems. The 
EU has established a rule for 2014-2020 that a certain mini-
mum share of each country’s allocation from the Structural 
Funds has to be dedicated to human capital investment 
through the European Social Fund. However, more effec-
tive fi nancing of these programmes depends primarily on 
the political will in the individual countries.
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Reformed Cohesion Policy needed
While the contribution of Cohesion Policy,8 including ESIF, 
has been obvious in regions that lag behind, the effective-
ness of these old budgetary tools in a new environment of 
East-Central Europe and the Balkans have been questioned 
in both qualitative and quantitative aspects. With support 
from academic researchers,9 new conditionalities have been 
proposed, with particular reference to countries that tend to 
violate EU values and norms (namely Hungary and Poland).
Cohesion policy and EU funds are certainly not ‘gifts’ to 
Member States, but rather indispensable parts of a bal-
anced and fair functioning economic governance and sin-
gle market in Europe. However, we have seen that systemic 
corruption can lead to a situation in which EU funds simply 
do not fulfi ll their original goal of improving competitiveness, 
developing infrastructure and investing in human capital or 
better governance. In some countries the situation is indeed 
grave and include examples of state-level fraud organised 
by political actors. That results in a waste of EU resources 
that inevitably undermines democracy, the public interest 
and the rule of law. Because of the lack of ability to exert 
control, some even accuse the EU of funding a cleptocratic 
and autocratic regime in Hungary.
Beyond the already functioning procedures of interrup-
tions and suspensions, sanctions can play a stronger role 
in stamping out irregularities, abuse and systemic fraud. 
However, the triggering of sanctions needs to be objective 
and transparent which requires a solid set of indicators and 
benchmarks as opposed to political considerations. Be-
sides, sanctions must be well-targeted to punish the perpe-
trator of the fund abuse rather than the innocent bystanders.
The EU could take funds into its own hands and distribute 
them in the Member States according to the original goals. 
In other words, the Commission should suspend shared 
management in cases of repeated abuse or systemic fraud. 
This way the EU’s actions cannot be regarded as blackmail; 
it could avoid the corrupted allocation channels and fi nanc-
ing of oligarchs with close government ties.
Direct management solutions could be introduced in a 
gradual and proportional manner: fi rst, only the funding that 
has already been refused due to signifi cant irregularities 
8 Cohesion Policy invests about one-third of the EU budget in the ser-
vice of economic, social and territorial cohesion, through three funds: 
Cohesion Fund, European Regional Development Fund and European 
Social Fund (the latter two are currently also called European Struc-
tural and Investment Funds or ESIF). The allocations of all these funds 
refl ect the income level of the benefi ciary country or region.
9 See F. H e i n e m a n n : Going for the Wallet? Rule-of-Law Conditional-
ity in the Next EU Multiannual Financial Framework, in: Intereconom-
ics, Vol. 53, No. 6, 2018, pp. 297-301.
or detected fraud would come under direct control of the 
Commission. Next, in case of systemic problems in opera-
tive programmes or the failure of management systems and 
democratic control mechanisms in a Member State, a more 
comprehensive direct management by the Commission 
could be established. Alternatively, a third type – assisted 
management – could be invented by placing EU experts in 
national agencies.10 Assisted management could be either 
requested by the Member State or, above a certain thresh-
old launched by the Commission.
In other words, the solution shouldn’t be to punish citizens of 
the affected Member States but to repair the management 
system in a way that is able to effi ciently prevent systemic 
misuse of funds by national political or management sys-
tems. Choosing the best way forward is by no means easy, 
especially with such a highly politicised instrument. Howev-
er, a greater effort in defense of EU values and resources is 
necessary. This should not only translate into taking a strong 
stand against populism, but also defend the rights and op-
portunities of the victims of misbehaving governments.
Eurozone enlargement: unfi nished business
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that economic and so-
cial development programmes (where they exist) should be 
tailored not only to the use of EU funds but also to plans 
for monetary reform. The euro was successfully introduced 
over the past decade in fi ve East-Central European coun-
tries. Signifi cantly, these were all among the smaller coun-
tries in the region. However, there was a price to be paid for 
this monetary success: for example, greater social inequal-
ity in Latvia and greater geographical inequality in Slovakia.
Eastern countries with an impressive adjustment record 
have earned international acclaim and Riga, the capital of 
Latvia, became a kind of Mecca of internal devaluation. 
However, while pursuing an aggressive strategy of internal 
devaluation (i.e. the reduction of wages, pensions and gov-
ernment expenditure) government policy pushes up unem-
ployment, poverty and out-migration and this can under-
mine the potential for economic growth in the longer run.
For example, from 2008 to 2013, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic have all seen their unemployment rates in-
crease by two to three percentage points. That said, these 
shifts in unemployment were below EU average (+3.8 per-
centage points) and certainly more modest than under the 
‘Baltic model’ where priority was given to maintaining the 
10 For more details on the limits of conditionality and the concept of 
assisted management see L. A n d o r : Resources for a Prosperous 
Europe: Redesigning the EU Budget in a Progressive Way, WISO 
DISKURS No. 18/2018, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2018, available at 
https://library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/wiso/14700.pdf.
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currencies’ peg with the euro. In addition, over the same 
period in countries that kept their own currencies, pressure 
on wages had led to a noticeable decline in the real com-
pensation per employee only in Hungary. External devalu-
ation through the exchange rate has reduced the pressure 
on these countries to pursue internal devaluation. The crisis 
may have led to more detrimental labour market outcomes 
if these countries had attempted to maintain the pre-crisis 
exchange rate of their currencies.
However, while currency devaluations reduce the pressure 
on labour markets during a downturn, they can hardly be 
seen as sustainable compensation for lacking competitive-
ness in the long run. Likewise, internal devaluation at the ex-
pense of the economy’s human capital is socially unaccep-
table and represents an equally poor substitute for reforms 
and investments that genuinely strengthen productivity and 
competitiveness. The point is again that East-Central Eu-
ropean countries need to invest in human capital in order 
to be able to reap the benefi ts of joining the Eurozone. The 
problem of economic adjustment within the monetary union 
is European by nature, so that satisfactory answers must be 
found at the European level: Member States confronted with 
economic shocks should not be left alone and condemned 
to internal devaluation in an effort to restore growth.
Conclusions
The last 15 years of economic transition in East-Central 
Europe can be characterised by a more convincing conver-
gence process as compared to the pre-EU phase. However, 
economic convergence in these countries was not neces-
sarily coupled with social convergence, which may under-
mine the continuation of strong economic performance for 
the next 15 years. The EU has to pay attention to the East-
West imbalances and consider new strategies for cohesion 
and convergence.
The major question for the next stage is whether the EU’s 
eastern region can continue to catch up without the inter-
nal socio-economic polarisation observed thus far, and how 
exactly the latter process could in fact be reversed. Wheth-
er EU membership has been positive for the new Member 
States is something that cannot be measured only in terms 
of GDP. The quality of economic development and the 
changes in society are at least as important, if not more im-
portant. That makes the overall picture somewhat uneven.
If the ‘new’ Member States wish to create a new develop-
ment path for themselves that has the qualities of being 
smart, sustainable and inclusive, and allows for conver-
gence towards Western social models and not only the EU 
income average, they must promote stronger (and genuine) 
social dialogue and social investment. If Europe moves to-
wards a more successful, globally competitive ‘balance of 
interests’ model of economy and society, this may bring sig-
nifi cant benefi ts for East-Central Europe. The question re-
mains whether the necessary social and political will exists 
on the ground and if the East and West can work together in 
partnership for such a purpose.
